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The Arbitrariness in “Arbitrariness” 
(And Overbreadth and Gross 
Disproportionality): Principle and 
Democracy in Section 7 of the 
Charter 
Alana Klein* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The scope of substantive protection in section 7 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 is expanding again. Recent 
developments in the Supreme Court of Canada’s section 7 doctrine 
support what one might call a substantive right to proportionate 
government action, where that action affects the most fundamental of 
rights: the rights to life, liberty and security of the person. In PHS 
Community Services v. Canada, for example, the Supreme Court of 
Canada confirmed that when determining whether a law that interferes 
with the section 7 rights is arbitrary, overbroad, or grossly 
disproportionate, courts must closely examine the relationship between a 
law’s ends and its means.2 In doing so, they must look beyond whether a 
                                                                                                             
* Faculty of Law, McGill University. 
1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2 Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, 
[2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “PHS”]. The move toward proportionality analysis may be 
a partial or contested one. See Kent Roach, “Section 7 of the Charter and National Security: Rights 
Protection and Proportionality versus Deference and Status” (2012) 42 Ottawa L. Rev. 337 
(identifying, in the context of national security, competing strands of s. 7 jurisprudence: one 
requiring that limits on life, liberty and security of the person be justified as proportionate, and 
another based on a priori deference to governments).  
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piece of legislation could conceivably do what it purports to do, and 
examine whether it does in fact. This is a far less deferential form of 
arbitrariness review than previous jurisprudence had suggested. 
Given the broad range of legislative and administrative decisions that 
might have an impact on life, liberty and security of the person, the de-
velopment could greatly expand the scope of questions that can be 
subjected to section 7 review. Moreover, in the context of increasing 
concerns that lawmaking (most notably the federal crime agenda) ignores 
empirical evidence and is made with little democratic input beyond ordi-
nary political processes, the focus on perverse impacts in section 7 could 
play an important role in ferreting out government policies that affect the 
most fundamental of rights and that are based on ideology or stereotype 
over evidence.  
Yet some worry that the empirical challenge of means-testing 
government policies in a complex world would permit any judge who 
simply disapproves of a law to find that it fails the means-ends 
weighing.3 This objection recalls institutional capacity and legitimacy 
concerns that have dogged section 7 since its early days. Part II of this 
paper describes how courts have struggled, often unsuccessfully, to set 
limits on expansiveness and subjectivity in section 7 interpretation. That 
history suggests that the increasing prominence of proportionality 
analysis in section 7 may be understood as a way to avoid the difficult 
task of setting normative boundaries on the scope of the provision. 
Part III examines the claim that arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross 
disproportionality analysis invites capricious decision-making and 
concludes that it may be impossible to avoid substantive normativity in 
proportionality analysis. Part IV argues that this concern is far from new: 
it has been central in our evaluation of proportionality analysis in section 
1 of the Charter. Drawing on experience with proportionality analysis 
under section 1 of the Charter, it argues that it may be possible for courts 
to means-test government policy in a principled and transparent way, but 
that this requires a link to a substantive conception of the purpose of the 
Charter guarantee in question. So long as courts continue to perpetuate 
the illusion that section 7 means-testing is value-neutral, allegations of 
capriciousness will persist. Finally, the paper concludes in Part V with 
some preliminary suggestions about how section 7’s purpose might be 
understood so that means-testing might respond to policies that are 
                                                                                                             
3 Peter Hogg, “The Brilliant Career of Section 7 of the Charter” (2012) 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
195 [hereinafter “Hogg, ‘The Brilliant Career’”]. 
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generated with limited empirical support and with limited democratic 
legitimacy beyond ordinary political processes.  
II. ELASTICITY AND LEGITIMACY IN SECTION 7 OF THE CHARTER 
The increasing reach and prominence of proportionality analysis 
should be understood in light of section 7’s history. Jamie Cameron 
describes section 7 as the Charter’s “problem child”4 precisely because 
of its potential for elasticity.5 The entitlements listed in the first clause — 
to life, but especially to liberty and security of the person — are far more 
general than the remaining rights listed under the heading “legal rights” 
in sections 8 to 14. The second clause — the principles of fundamental 
justice — is, on the face of its text alone, devoid of substantive content. 
In the context of ambiguous constitutional text protecting such 
fundamental but general concepts as liberty and justice, legitimacy may 
be lost in two ways. It may be lost in a liberal interpretation: is the Court 
overreaching and protecting more than the text of the provision provides? 
But it may also be lost in narrow interpretation: is the Court shirking its 
responsibilities to uphold constitutional standards? Because of this 
tension, section 7’s history can be told as a struggle to preserve the 
Court’s institutional legitimacy in the face of its duty to give meaning to 
this ambiguous text.6  
The development of jurisprudence on the definition of liberty 
illustrates the different ways in which judges have struggled to give 
meaning to section 7 entitlements without compromising the Court’s 
institutional role, and their ultimate difficulty resisting the expansive 
force of the concept. Perhaps most famously, Wilson J. in her concurring 
reasons in R. v. Morgentaler, defined liberty broadly to “guarantee to 
every individual a degree of personal autonomy over important decisions 
intimately affecting their private lives”,7 including the right to terminate 
                                                                                                             
4 Jamie Cameron, “From MVR to Chaoulli v. Quebec: The Road Not Taken and the Future 
of Section 7” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 105, at 105 [hereinafter “Cameron”].  
5 Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S. 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 
2 S.C.R. 486, at 498 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Motor Vehicle Reference”].  
6 A thorough history of this struggle is too complex for this short paper, but see Cameron, 
supra, note 4 for a careful analysis of the various competing strands of Supreme Court of Canada 
jurisprudence interpreting both s. 7’s entitlements and its internal limitations clauses, and the ways in 
which concerns over preserving institutional legitimacy drove and troubled the jurisprudence.  
7 R. v. Morgentaler, [1993] S.C.J. No. 48, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 462 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Morgentaler”].  
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a pregnancy. Similarly, in R. v. Jones, she held that the liberty interest 
included a parent’s right “to raise children in accordance with his 
conscientious beliefs”.8 Early lines of jurisprudence suggested that 
“human dignity is precisely what underlies the liberty interest in s. 7”,9 
and, on that basis, held that section 7 could extend, for example, to rights 
to choose one’s occupation.10  
These cases, positing a broad, arguably amorphous substantive right 
to liberty, competed for prominence in a fractured jurisprudence with 
Lamer J.’s (later Lamer C.J.C.’s) steadfast efforts to confine liberty to 
encounters with the administration of justice that put physical freedom at 
risk.11 His interpretation was based in part on the text and his view of the 
purpose of section 7. For example, he sought to distinguish liberty in 
section 7 from the freedoms protected in section 2 of the Charter, and 
suggested that the concepts of life, liberty and security of the person are 
connected through the concept of a person’s corporeal or physical 
being.12 But Lamer C.J.C.’s approach to section 7 was also clearly 
motivated by concerns over the limits of the courts’ institutional role: he 
stated that a broader interpretation of liberty “would have the effect of 
conferring prima facie constitutional protection on all eccentricities 
expressed by members of our society under the rubric of ‘liberty’” and 
would “inevitably lead to a situation where we would have government 
by judges”.13 In Lamer C.J.C.’s view, review could legitimately be 
undertaken so long as it was confined to matters within the justice 
system, an area in which judges are expert.  
Despite Lamer J.’s resistance, the Court ultimately adopted the 
broader conception of liberty whose roots lay in Morgentaler and Jones. 
In Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), the Court 
pronounced unequivocally that the liberty interest is no longer limited to 
                                                                                                             
8 R. v. Jones, [1986] S.C.J. No. 56, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284, at 319 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Jones”].  
9 Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [1998] B.C.J. No. 1092, 160 
D.L.R. (4th) 303, at para. 88 (B.C.C.A.). 
10 Mia v. British Columbia (Medical Services Commission), [1985] B.C.J. No. 2920, 17 
D.L.R. (4th) 385, at 414-15 (B.C.S.C.);Wilson v. British Columbia (Medical Services Commission), 
[1988] B.C.J. No. 1566, 30 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1, at 18 (B.C.S.C.) . 
11 See, e.g., Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] 
S.C.J. No. 52, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Prostitution Reference”]; B. (R.) v. 
Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315, at 348 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Children’s Aid Society”]. 
12 Children’s Aid Society, id. at 347-48. 
13 Id., at 347.  
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freedom from physical restraint; rather, “‘liberty’ is engaged where state 
compulsions or prohibitions affect important and fundamental life 
choices. ... In our society, individuals are entitled to make decisions of 
fundamental importance free from state interference.”14 The struggle for 
boundaries continued: though it recognized the broader liberty right in 
principle, the Court limited liberty of the person to “a narrow sphere of 
inherently personal decision-making” and held that the delay in process-
ing a human rights complaint in Blencoe did not, on the facts, prevent the 
applicant from making any fundamental personal choices.15 In fact, a 
majority of the Supreme Court has yet to recognize a case in which fun-
damental personal choices so affect the liberty interest as to run afoul of 
section 7,16 though lower courts have recognized such instances of the 
liberty interest.17 Further, despite this broader interpretation of the liberty 
interest, the Court has purported to draw the line at the suggestion that 
section 7 protects “purely economic interests”.18 As a result, some early 
section 7 cases, such as those suggesting that the right to liberty includes 
“the right to choose one’s occupation and where to pursue it”19 are now 
considered wrongly decided.20 Meanwhile, in other cases, rights that might 
be characterized as economic have been recognized among section 7’s 
substantive entitlements.21 
                                                                                                             
14 Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] S.C.J. No. 43, [2000] 2 
S.C.R. 307, at para. 49 (S.C.C.). 
15 Id., at para. 54. 
16 It has, however, recognized that sufficiently severe psychological distress might engage 
security of the person. See New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), 
[1999] S.C.J. No. 47, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 (S.C.C.).  
17 R. v. Parker, [2000] O.J. No. 2787, 49 O.R. (3d) 481, at para. 92 (Ont. C.A.) (holding 
that a prohibition on medical marijuana engaged the liberty interest by denying the applicant his 
choice of medication to alleviate the effects of an illness with life-threatening consequences); 
Victoria (City) v. Adams, [2009] B.C.J. No. 2451, 313 D.L.R (4th) 29, at para. 109 (B.C.C.A.) 
(holding that a prohibition on the erection of temporary shelters in public parks, in the context of 
insufficient homeless shelters in the area, constituted “a significant interference with [the 
applicants’] dignity and independence”).  
18 See, e.g., R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, 
at 786 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Edwards Books”]; Siemens v. Manitoba (Attorney General), [2002] 
S.C.J. No. 69, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 6, at para. 46 (S.C.C.) (holding that the ability to operate a video 
lottery terminal is not a “fundamental life choice” because it is a purely economic interest). 
19 Wilson v. British Columbia (Medical Services Commission), [1988] B.C.J. No. 1566, 30 
B.C.L.R. (2d) 1, at 18 (B.C.C.A.). 
20 Hamish Stewart, Fundamental Justice: Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (Toronto, ON: Irwin Law, 2012), at 92 [hereinafter “Stewart”].  
21 See, e.g., Cameron, supra, note 4, at note 198 (characterizing the rights claimed in 
Godbout v. Longueuil (City), [1997] S.C.J. No. 95, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Godbout”] and Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R 791 
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The broadened, more elastic scope in section 7’s entitlements could 
be expected to put additional pressure on its second clause to respond to 
concerns about judicial overreaching. Indeed, the need to cabin the po-
tential breadth of the principles of fundamental justice was recognized 
from the moment section 7 was given substantive rather than merely pro-
cedural content. In one of Charter jurisprudence’s most oft-cited 
passages, the majority in the Motor Vehicle Reference explained that “the 
principles of fundamental justice are to be found in the basic tenets of 
our legal system. They do not lie in the realm of general public policy but 
in the inherent domain of the judiciary as guardian of the legal system.”22 
These principles of fundamental justice were thus limited to principles — 
however substantive and normative — that have been “recognized as 
essential elements of a system for the administration of justice which is 
founded upon a belief in ‘the dignity and worth of the human person’ ... 
and on ‘the rule of law’”.23  
In the Motor Vehicle Reference, the Supreme Court recognized its 
first principle of fundamental justice: that criminal liability requires 
proof of fault.24 And in the years following, many substantive principles 
of fundamental justice were recognized, mostly linked to the institutions 
of criminal justice. These have included the pre-trial right to silence,25 a 
prohibition on convicting someone for murder if they did not intend to 
cause death,26 and a right to make a full answer and defence, in turn im-
plying a disclosure obligation on the Crown.27  
Even from the early days, however, there were principles of funda-
mental justice with less precisely substantive content than those related to 
penal responsibility listed in the previous paragraph. In Jones, La Forest J., 
writing for the plurality of the Court, recognized that a law limiting life, 
liberty and security of the person would violate the principles of funda-
mental justice if it were “manifestly unfair”.28 This language was 
                                                                                                             
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chaoulli”] as “economic or quasi-economic in nature”. In Godbout, the Court 
invalidated a municipal resolution requiring municipal employees to live within its territorial limits, 
with two judges relying on the liberty interest in s. 7 of the Charter. In Chaoulli, access to private 
health insurance was protected under the guarantee of security of the person.  
22 Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 5, at 503. 
23 Id. 
24 Id., at 514. 
25 R. v. Hebert, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151 (S.C.C.).  
26 R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.); R. v. Martineau, 
[1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.). 
27 R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.).  
28 Jones, supra, note 8, at para. 41. 
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famously picked up in Morgentaler to invalidate a criminal law limiting 
women’s access to abortion. The regime purported to give access to 
therapeutic abortions, but contained so many barriers to its own opera-
tion that access was practically unavailable:29 effectively, the law did not 
further its own objectives.30 Justice McLachlin, in her dissenting opinion 
in Rodriguez, equated manifest unfairness with arbitrariness and found 
the prohibition on assisted suicide to be arbitrary.31 The prohibition on 
arbitrariness only rose to prominence 10 years later, however, in the plu-
rality and majority decisions in Chaoulli and R. v. Malmo-Levine32 
respectively. Two other principles targeting the means-ends relationship 
of government action developed alongside the rule against arbitrariness: 
R. v. Heywood recognized that laws must not be overbroad;33 and 
Malmo-Levine held that a law would violate the principles of fundamen-
tal justice if it were “grossly disproportionate in its effects on accused 
persons, when considered in light of [its] objective[s]”.34  
The elevation of means-ends relationship of government action to a 
principle of fundamental justice has been criticized for “lack[ing] a con-
tent and a methodology”.35 Indeed, McLachlin J.’s early reliance on 
arbitrariness in her dissenting opinion in Rodriguez prompted the major-
ity, which found no violation of section 7’s second clause, to reiterate 
that the principles of fundamental justice must be “legal principles”; 
there must be sufficient societal consensus that the alleged principle is 
“vital or fundamental to our societal notions of justice”; and they must be 
                                                                                                             
29 Morgentaler, supra, note 7, at 72, per Dickson C.J.C. and Lamer J.; see similarly 
Morgentaler, at 110, per Beetz J. and Estey J. (stating that the scheme’s requirements “are 
manifestly unfair because they have no connection whatsoever with Parliament’s objectives in 
establishing the administrative structure”).  
30 Id., at 110, per Beetz J. and Estey J.  
31 Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 
519, at para. 206 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rodriguez”] (holding that the purpose of the prohibition on 
assisted suicide — the protection of autonomy — was not furthered by the law in the case of Sue 
Rodriguez and that therefore “the objective that motivates the legislative scheme that Parliament has 
enacted to treat suicide is not reflected in its treatment of assisted suicide”). 
32 R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Malmo-Levine”].  
33 R. v. Heywood, [1994] S.C.J. No. 101, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Heywood”]. 
34 Supra, note 32, at para. 169. 
35 Cameron, supra, note 4, at 159 (observing that the arbitrariness standard in Rodriguez, 
“in function and effect, propose[s] a ‘fairness standard’ which allows the court to invalidate laws 
simply because they are considered unfair”).  
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capable of being “identified with precision and applied to situations in a 
manner that yields predictable results”.36  
These concerns sharpen as proportionality analysis has become 
increasingly prominent37 and powerful38 in recent years. As the next 
section demonstrates, proportionality analysis — particularly in the more 
searching form that has emerged since PHS — has created more space 
for the often hidden influence of subjective values. This is so despite the 
fact that proportionality analysis purports to be a value-neutral or 
content-neutral task that does not pass on the substantive ends of 
government policy but simply on whether the government is pursuing its 
own ends faithfully and with sufficient precision.  
III. SUBJECTIVITY IN “ARBITRARINESS, OVERBREADTH AND  
GROSS DISPROPORTIONALITY” 
The claim that arbitrariness, overbreadth and disproportionality 
analysis reflects little more than judges’ policy preferences is compelling. 
Capricious or unprincipled decision-making may come from the way the 
court characterizes the purpose of allegedly infringing action, as well as 
how the court appreciates facts in its analysis of arbitrariness, over-
breadth and disproportionality. 
1. Purposes 
Any consideration of the relationship between a government action’s 
means and its ends requires that the goals — or in the language of 
Oakes,39 the purpose — of that action be identified. Yet, there is no clear 
methodology for identifying the purpose of laws or policies against 
which its means are to be tested. How a law or policy’s purpose is con-
strued and deployed may determine the results of means-testing analysis 
in a number of ways.  
                                                                                                             
36 Rodriguez, supra, note 31, at 590-91. 
37 See, e.g., PHS, supra, note 2; Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, [2012] O.J. 
No. 1296, 109 O.R. (3d) 1, at para. 68 (Ont. C.A.), appeal heard and reserved June 13, 2013, [2012] 
S.C.C.A. No. 159 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bedford”]; Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2012] 
B.C.J. No. 1196, 287 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (B.C.S.C.), revd [2013] B.C.J. No. 2227, 2013 BCCA 435 
(B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Carter”].  
38 See supra, note 2 and accompanying text.  
39 R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oakes”]. 
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In PHS, for example, the Supreme Court measured the federal re-
fusal to grant a statutory exemption from drug laws against the purpose 
of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act40 as a whole: the protection 
of health and public safety. This characterization of the purpose of the 
legislation made it easier for the Court to find the denial of the constitu-
tional exemption arbitrary and grossly disproportionate: creating criminal 
law obstacles for Insite did nothing to promote health and safety (on the 
contrary), even as it presented a uniform stance on the possession of nar-
cotics. Had the purpose of the Act been characterized as discouraging, or 
even curbing, the use of illegal drugs, then it would have been more dif-
ficult for the claimants to position Insite as furthering rather than 
undermining the goals of the legislation.  
In Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, the Ontario Court of 
Appeal’s finding that Canada’s anti-prostitution laws were overbroad and 
grossly disproportionate to their purpose was driven largely by the ways in 
which the court characterized the purpose of those laws. The court 
considered multiple possible purposes behind the criminal prohibitions on 
operating bawdyhouses, living off the avails of prostitution and 
communicating for the purposes of prostitution, and ultimately defined 
each rather narrowly. The Attorney General of Ontario urged the broadest 
possible characterizations. It suggested, for example, that the bawdyhouse 
provisions were designed to promote values of dignity and equality by 
criminalizing a practice that reinforces anti-egalitarian attitudes.41 (It is 
worth noting that such a characterization would permit a reviewing court 
to determine that a law can serve its purpose simply by “sending a 
message”, which sits uneasily with the requirement in PHS that laws 
affecting the section 7 interest must serve their purpose in fact, on the 
evidence, and not merely in theory.) The Attorney General of Canada 
argued that the purpose of the bawdyhouse provisions was to discourage 
and deter prostitution in order to prevent harm to those who engage in 
prostitution outside of the public view. The court, based on historical 
analysis, ultimately concluded that the law’s purpose was to combat 
neighbourhood disruption and disorder. With the purpose so narrowly 
construed, the court could more easily find the bawdyhouse provisions 
overbroad and grossly disproportionate. The similarly narrowly defined 
purpose of the living-off-the-avails provisions — the prevention of 
                                                                                                             
40 S.C. 1996, c. 19. 
41 Bedford, supra, note 37, at para. 182.  
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exploitation — allowed the court to conclude that it too, was overbroad in 
its scope and grossly disproportionate in its effects.  
The judges at the Court of Appeal were ultimately divided by their 
disagreement over how the communication provision’s purpose ought to 
be construed.42 The majority preferred a broader interpretation of the 
objective of the communication provision: addressing the social 
nuisances flowing directly from prostitution (street congestion and noise, 
oral harassment of non-participants and general detrimental effects on 
passers-by, especially children), as well as other behaviours which in its 
view were “associated” with prostitution (such as drug possession, drug 
trafficking, public intoxication and organized crime).43 The expanded 
conception of the purpose of the provision permitted the majority to 
place greater weight on the extent to which the provision served its goals 
in its analysis of gross disproportionality. The dissent, by contrast, found 
that the impact of the communication provision on the lives and safety of 
sex workers was grossly disproportionate in part because it weighed the 
impacts of the legislation against a narrower range of government 
objectives (and arguably less serious ones): “street congestion and noise, 
oral harassment of non-participants and general detrimental effects on 
passers-by or bystanders, especially children”.44 
In R. v. Khawaja, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld a criminal 
prohibition on participation in terrorist activity by construing the purpose 
of the legislation narrowly, and then interpreting the prohibition narrowly 
in accordance with that purpose.45 In doing so, it arguably avoided close 
scrutiny of the prohibition’s likely effects. 
Opponents of the prohibition on participation in terrorist activity were 
concerned that it had the potential to encompass people who, while not 
terrorists themselves, had some involvement — financial or political — 
with terrorists, even if, for example, the accused’s contribution never 
actually enhanced the group’s activity to carry out terrorist activity, or the 
accused did not know the nature of the activity being considered.46 
                                                                                                             
42 All the members of the court rejected the broadest interpretation of the purpose of 
legislation urged by the Attorney General of Ontario — to combat the “normalizing” effect 
exposure to prostitution can have on children (id., at para. 286).  
43 Id., at para. 307. 
44 Id., at para. 347. 
45 R. v. Khawaja, [2012] S.C.J. No. 69, [2102] 3 S.C.R. 555 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Khawaja”].  
46 The Canadian Bar Association, for example, feared that the law could apply to lawyers 
who represented known terrorists (Canadian Bar Association, Submission on Bill C-36 – Anti-
terrorism Act (October 2001), online: Canadian Bar Association <http://www.cba.org/pdf/ 
submission.pdf>, at 26); Kent Roach, “The New Terrorism Offences and The Criminal Law” in 
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The law’s purpose, reasoned the Court, was to prosecute and prevent 
terrorism, not to punish individuals for “innocent, socially useful or casual 
acts, which, absent any intent, indirectly contribute to a terrorist 
activity”.47 Having so circumscribed the purpose, the Court then went on 
to interpret the participation prohibition narrowly in conformity with that 
purpose — an offender must have the “higher subjective purpose” of 
helping a terrorist to carry out terrorism — and ultimately upheld it as 
constitutional.48 By elevating the mental element of the offence, the Court 
in some respects appears to answer its opponents’ concerns. However, it 
has been criticized for failing to accurately reflect government’s intention, 
and also for its failure to clarify what such a “higher subjective purpose” 
might be.49  
PHS, Bedford and Khawaja demonstrate that courts may strike 
down, uphold, or craft the meaning of legislation through the way in 
which they cast legislative purpose against which to assess arbitrariness, 
overbreadth, and gross disproportionality. Even as it denies that courts 
pass on the wisdom of those legislative goals, the process leaves much 
scope for subjectivity.  
2. Arbitrariness, Overbreadth and Gross Disproportionality 
We are in the early days of the development of the principles of fun-
damental justice that relate to the means-ends fit, or proportionality, of 
government action. Although courts have acknowledged challenges in 
distinguishing among the doctrines for overbreadth, arbitrariness and 
gross disproportionality, these are beginning to emerge as a set of three 
distinct principles.50 Each may be criticized for failing to adequately 
cabin judicial caprices.  
(a) Arbitrariness 
Chaoulli ushered in a more searching test for arbitrariness that was 
ultimately endorsed by the full court in PHS, one that asks not only 
                                                                                                             
Patrick Macklem, Ronald J. Daniels & Kent Roach, eds., The Security of Freedom: Essays on 
Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) 151, at 161. 
47 Khawaja, supra, note 45, at para. 44.  
48 Id., at para. 45.  
49 Peter Sankoff, “Khawaja: Mixed Messages on the Meaning of Intention, Purpose and 
Desire” (2013), available on SSRN, at 8 [hereinafter “Sankoff”].  
50 See Bedford, supra, note 37, at para. 151.  
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whether a law could reasonably serve its purpose,51 but whether it does 
on the facts. The judicial standard for arbitrariness is not settled:52 In 
Chaoulli itself, three judges would find state action affecting life, liberty 
or security of the person if it is not “necessary”53 to further the state ob-
jective. Three would have posited a stricter test: ask instead whether the 
state action “bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with, the state interest 
that lies behind the legislation”.54 The latter test is more deferential, 
though the reasons for preferring one level of deference over another is 
not clearly articulated in the case. Both definitions of arbitrariness, how-
ever, rely closely on facts. And, indeed, it was the Court’s appreciation of 
the facts in Chaoulli about the relationship between the ban on parallel 
private health insurance and the necessary conditions for protecting the 
public health care system that most divided the Court and that has at-
tracted the most scholarly criticism.55  
(b) Overbreadth 
The doctrine of overbreadth raises similar concerns about judges’ 
abilities to appropriately weigh facts in the proportionality assessment. In 
R. v. Heywood, for example, the Supreme Court of Canada struck down a 
provision of the Criminal Code56 that prohibited anyone who had been 
convicted of sexual assault from “loitering in or near a schoolyard, play-
ground, public park, or bathing area”. Exemplifying concerns discussed 
above, the majority and dissent disagreed about the purpose of the legis-
lation: was it designed to protect children only, or also adults? They 
                                                                                                             
51 See, e.g., Malmo-Levine, supra, note 32.  
52 PHS, supra, note 2, at para. 132. 
53 Chaoulli, supra, note 21, at paras. 131-132.  
54 Id., at para. 232. This latter test was adopted by the courts in Bedford, supra, note 37, at 
paras. 145-147 and Carter, supra, note 37, at para. 1332 (S.C.).  
55 See Martha Jackman, “The Last Line of Defence for [Which?] Citizens: Accountability, 
Equality and the Right to Health in Chaoulli” (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall L.J. 349, at 357; Hamish 
Stewart, “Implications of Chaoulli for Fact-Finding in Constitutional Cases” in Colleen Flood, Kent 
Roach & Lorne Sossin, eds., Access to Care, Access to Justice (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2005) [hereinafter “Access to Care”] 207, at 211; Charles G. Wright, “Different 
Interpretations of ‘Evidence’ and Implications for the Canadian Healthcare System” in Access to 
Care, id., 220, at 223 (all criticized the Supreme Court’s failure to attend to expert evidence 
justifying the insurance ban, Wright calling it “utterly inexplicable”); Sujit Choudhry, “So What is 
the Real Legacy of Oakes? Two Decades of Proportionality Analysis under the Canadian Charter’s 
Section 1” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 501, at 534 [hereinafter “Choudhry”] (“The Court’s disregard for 
this evidence is nothing short of astonishing”).  
56 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
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disagreed about the interpretation of the legislation — notably around 
whether loitering required any malevolent intent beyond simply hanging 
around without any particular purpose. Most importantly for the present 
purposes, they disagreed about key factual questions, such as whether 
those who sexually assault adults are any more likely to pose a threat to 
children,57 and the magnitude of risks of re-offence for sexual offences.  
Most recently, in Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), the Supreme 
Court of British Columbia relied on the newly developed doctrine of 
overbreadth to read down the offence of assisting suicide, effectively re-
visiting the Supreme Court of Canada’s 1993 decision to uphold the 
same legislation in Rodriguez. The courts in both cases understood the 
prohibition’s purpose in the same way: to protect the vulnerable who 
might be induced in moments of weakness to commit suicide.58 What 
permitted revisiting Rodriguez, in the British Columbia Supreme Court’s 
estimation, was how the newly developed and searching doctrines of 
overbreadth and gross disproportionality interacted with new “legislative 
and social facts” (emphasis added) that were not available at the time 
Rodriguez was decided. These included experience in jurisdictions with 
legalized physician-assisted death, changes in palliative care practices 
including reliance on the more painful terminal sedation in order to end 
life without running afoul of the criminal law, changes in Canadian pub-
lic opinion, parliamentary and other reports since Rodriguez, and 
developments in medical ethics that found no meaningful ethical differ-
ence between physician-assisted suicide and end-of-life practices like 
withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment or administering 
palliative sedation that might hasten death.59 The Court ultimately 
granted a constitutional exemption for physician-assisted suicide on the 
factual bases that the risks inherent in permitting physician-assisted death 
could be mitigated through a system of judicial safeguards. It concluded 
that absolute prohibition was overbroad because it was neither necessary 
                                                                                                             
57 Heywood, supra, note 33, at 809, Gonthier J. In the dissent’s view: “Contrary to 
conventional wisdom, Dr Abel discovered that there is extensive cross-offending so that a given 
offender is likely to be involved in a variety of different activities throughout a lifetime.”  
58 Carter, supra, note 37. One of Smith J.’s reasons for departing from Rodriguez was that 
overbreadth and gross disproportionality have only more recently emerged and been articulated as 
distinct principles of fundamental justice. The Ontario Court of Appeal relied on similar reasoning to 
reconsider the prostitution offences in Bedford (supra, note 37) despite the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s prior consideration of the provisions in the Prostitution Reference (supra, note 11).  
59 Carter, supra, note 37, at paras. 942, 1336 (S.C.).  
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to prevent inducement of suicide by vulnerable persons, nor was it the 
least restrictive means by which to do so.60  
(c) Gross Disproportionality 
Gross disproportionality analysis has explicitly depended not only on 
how the facts are appreciated, but also on normative values and 
assumptions about the harms and benefits of government action. In 
Bedford, disagreement between the majority and dissenting justices about 
the disproportionate effect of the communication provisions on the lives 
and safety of street-based sex workers can be traced in part to different 
evaluations of the facts. The majority thought there was less evidence 
about the safety benefits of screening customers than there was about the 
benefits of moving indoors and hiring bodyguards; the dissenting judges, 
on the other hand, felt that the safety benefits of screening, as well as 
working in public as opposed to on isolated streets, were well 
established.61 The majority found that street-based sex workers could 
mitigate the harms that came from the inability to verbally screen 
prospective customers, for example by relying on their intuition, checking 
customers’ appearance, backseats of cars, or having friends nearby to take 
down licence plates.62 The dissent considered that these alternatives were 
not as effective at mitigating the dangers of sex work as unrushed verbal 
negotiation.63  
But the different appreciation of the facts in Bedford was also driven 
by values about the role of government in driving and responding to sys-
temic inequality. The majority took a formal approach, holding that 
poverty, addiction, gender and race are the primary sources of street-
based sex workers’ marginalization and that the communication provi-
sion itself only partially contributed to the harm they faced on the streets. 
Weighing the harm caused by the communication provision only, and 
subtracting the impact of systemic factors, the majority concluded that 
the legislation’s harm was not grossly disproportionate to its benefits in 
combating social nuisance. The dissent points out that this “turn[s] the 
question of pre-existing disadvantage on its head”.64 Rather than diluting 
                                                                                                             
60 Id., at paras. 1363-1367. 
61 Bedford, supra, note 37, at para. 349.  
62 Id., at para. 313.  
63 Id., at para. 349. 
64 Id. at para. 357. 
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the adverse effect of the communication provision, in the dissent’s view 
pre-existing marginalization exacerbates it. The question of whether and 
how systemic vulnerability ought to be considered in a purposive inter-
pretation of section 7 will be discussed further below.  
IV. DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN: RULES AND PRINCIPLES FOR  
GUIDING DEFERENCE UNDER SECTION 1 OF THE CHARTER 
The yearning for principle in managing deference under section 7 of 
the Charter should feel deeply familiar. Struggle over deference to 
Parliament has been a leitmotif in section 7’s own history, as suggested 
in Part II of this paper. Moreover, although the more searching section 7 
standard is relatively recent, rights-affecting government policy has been 
means-tested for nearly 30 years under section 1 of the Charter, via the 
Oakes65 test on proportionality. Over time, the test has been criticized for 
the ways in which courts have retreated from its robust application to 
allow greater deference to government, and, through this process, for its 
growing indeterminacy.66 This section describes the ways in which 
section 1 analysis has grown increasingly deferential — most notably by 
taking the factual assessment about policy impact to the forefront of the 
judicial task — such that it presents similar challenges of judicial 
capacity and legitimacy as in the proportionality analysis in section 7. 
Next, it canvasses some of the devices that the Supreme Court has used 
to bring principle to that assessment and finds that these must be tethered 
to the purpose of section 1 to have meaning in context.  
Oakes, on its face, presents a more exacting form of proportionality 
test than the one emerging through section 7. First, under section 1, gov-
ernment bears the burden of demonstrating proportionality; section 7, as 
a substantive right, places the burden on the rights claimant to prove the 
absence of a sufficient connection between government law or policy 
and its impact. Oakes requires government to demonstrate a pressing and 
substantial objective; courts applying the section 7 proportionality analy-
sis identify, but do not evaluate, government objectives. At this point, it 
may be too early to distinguish the section 7 standard on arbitrariness 
from the rational connection test in Oakes, as well as Oakes’ minimal 
                                                                                                             
65 Supra, note 39.  
66 Joel Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1997), at 27-30.  
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impairment from the rule against overbreadth in section 7. The final 
Oakes branch requiring proportionality, however, is clearly more strin-
gent than section 7’s prohibition on gross disproportionality.  
But over the years, the courts seem to have softened the requirements 
of Oakes,67 often in ways that have increased the burden on courts to 
pronounce upon more subjective questions such as the impact of rights 
infringements on individuals and the importance and effectiveness of 
government policy.68 The need for a “pressing and substantial objective” 
can now be satisfied by objectives that are merely “valid” and “suffi-
ciently important”.69 The demand for careful legislative design at the 
rational connection stage has been replaced with the requirement that the 
means simply further, in some way, the legislative objective.70 The sub-
jective task of courts has been broadened through two developments in 
the “minimal impairment” test. First, “minimally impairing” has been 
downgraded to “impairing as little as is reasonably possible”. Courts 
must perform the more subjective task of determining whether there is 
some “reasonable alternative scheme” instead of whether the measure 
was the least intrusive available.71 More recently, in Alberta v. Hutterian 
Brethren of Wilson Colony, the Supreme Court qualified that the minimal 
impairment test cannot be satisfied by pointing to “less drastic means 
which do not actually achieve the government’s objective”.72 Instead, one 
must ask whether there is an alternative, less drastic means that will 
achieve the government’s objectives just as fully.73 This question itself 
draws courts closer into difficult factual questions about the extent to 
which means fulfil their purpose in fact. Moreover, it pushes the analysis 
toward the final Oakes stage of balancing proportionality between the 
infringement and the objective, which “allows for a broader assessment 
                                                                                                             
67 See Choudhry, supra, note 55, at 507. 
68 See Lorraine Weinrib, “Limitations on Rights in a Constitutional Democracy” (1996) 6 
Caribbean L. Rev. 428, lamenting the softening of Oakes.  
69 R. v. Whyte, [1988] S.C.J. No. 63, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 36 (S.C.C.); Prostitution 
Reference, supra, note 11, at 1190.  
70 Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [1990] S.C.J. No. 65, [1990] 
2 S.C.R. 232 (S.C.C.). 
71 Edward Books, supra, note 18, at 772.  
72 Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 
567, at para. 54 (S.C.C.).  
73 Id., at para. 55. Justice LeBel, dissenting, noted how challenging it would be to meet the 
test: “No means that would not allow the objective to be realized to its fullest extent could be 
considered as a reasonable alternative.”  
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of whether the benefits of the impugned law are worth the cost of the 
rights limitation”.74  
The overall result is that as the scope for weighing of the deleterious 
and salutary effects of legislation expands, as analysis is pushed further 
into the realm of factual contest, it may become easier for judges to ap-
preciate those facts in conformity with their own normative preferences 
and frameworks.75 Petter and Monahan’s words two years into the loos-
ening of the Oakes test remain apt: “The court still has the stringent 
Oakes test sitting on the shelf waiting to be dusted off for use at an ap-
propriate moment ... any time that the Court wants to strike down a law,” 
but “on the other hand, when they are dealing with a law with which they 
are relatively unsympathetic, the Court is able to step aside and basically 
allow the legislature to do what it wants”.76  
The Supreme Court, for a number of years, worked to develop de-
vices for managing subjectivity under the loosening Oakes test by listing 
considerations to guide deference at the minimal impairment stage 
(which has, until recently, been understood to be the point of greatest 
friction in the section 1 analysis). These categories and classifications all 
relate in different ways to courts’ institutional capacity and legitimacy in 
interfering with government choices in the name of Charter protection.  
The Court would construe minimal impairment more strictly, for ex-
ample, where the Court enjoyed some institutional advantage or 
expertise, as the Court felt it did in criminal justice contexts.77 (This 
same reasoning may explain the Court’s early efforts, based on the Motor 
Vehicle Reference, to constrain the principles of fundamental justice to 
legal, most often criminal, institutions.) By contrast, where the Court is 
mediating concerns between competing claims of different groups, it 
might not be able to achieve the same degree of certainty, and might need 
to defer, as it did in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General).78 
Where the interests that government is protecting are those of vulnerable 
groups, such as children,79 employees80 or low-skilled, non-unionized 
                                                                                                             
74 Id., at para. 77.  
75 See Benjamin L. Berger, “Section 1, Constitutional Reasoning, and Cultural Difference: 
Assessing the Impacts of Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony” (2010) 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 25.  
76 Andrew J. Petter & Patrick J. Monahan, “Developments in Constitutional Law: The 
1986-87 Term” (1988) 10 S.C.L.R. 61, at 95.  
77 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 
at 994 (S.C.C.).  
78 Id., at 994.  
79 Id. 
80 Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] S.C.J. No. 45, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 (S.C.C.).  
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workers,81 greater deference has been urged, presumably on the basis that 
the government might, too, be protecting Charter-related interests 
through legislation. In addition, the Court might view competing re-
source claims as a reason to defer. In McKinney v. University of Guelph, 
for example, the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to a 
university’s mandatory retirement policy on the basis that universities 
needed financial flexibility, for example to recruit new faculty mem-
bers.82 Finally, the Court might rank constitutionally protected interests, 
and require a higher standard of proof for the more important ones.83 This 
is most evident in the free speech jurisprudence, where “core” free speech 
interests like political speech warrant more scrutiny than “peripheral” 
speech like commercial expression or sexually explicit expression.84  
The proportionality requirement in section 7, as it has grown more 
searching, has likewise come to focus on contestable factual assessments. 
In managing the empirical task, it might be tempting to reach for a simi-
lar set of classifications to determine deference under section 7. And 
indeed, the courts’ categories for section 1 deference may be able to ex-
plain some of the section 7 arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross 
disproportionality decisions so far. A lower deference standard in crimi-
nal law cases could justify or explain the Court’s assertiveness in 
construing both the purpose and the interpretation of the legislation in 
Khawaja narrowly via concepts of intent.85 Deference to legislative pro-
tections of the vulnerable might justify the Supreme Court favouring 
Insite’s continued operation over the uniform application of the federal 
drug law. The majority in Bedford may have applied its particular brand 
of vulnerability analysis to both sides of the balancing exercise, which 
might explain why it deferred to the government’s interest in protecting 
children from seeing prostitution-related communication to justify the 
risks to the lives and safety of sex workers posed by the communication 
prohibition.  
                                                                                                             
81 Edward Books, supra, note 18. 
82 McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] S.C.J. No. 122, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229, at 286 
(S.C.C.). 
83 This evokes the U.S. practice of applying strict scrutiny to fundamental rights, but to test 
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84 The Supreme Court rejected an argument from interveners representing sexual minorities 
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85 Even if it may have gotten them wrong (Sankoff, supra, note 49).  
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Yet in section 1 doctrine, these classifications failed to stand up as 
determinants of deference for a number of reasons.86 First, courts failed 
to consistently follow these schemas. In the context of freedom of 
expression, for example, the Court has in practice shown almost as much 
deference on political speech, which is considered “core” speech, as it 
has on other issues.87 In addition, the distinctions often lacked internal 
cogency. For example, courts could not justify lower deference on 
criminal law cases on the basis that they were balancing state versus 
individual interests alone, given the stake that victims, and society more 
broadly, have in the scope and enforcement of criminal law. For this 
reason, in Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General) in 
1998, the majority of the Court rejected the criminal/non-criminal binary 
and stated that “nothing ... suggests that there is one category of cases in 
which a lower standard of s. 1 is applied and another in which a higher 
standard is applied”.88 The parallel with courts’ difficulty confining 
section 7’s reach to institutions of criminal justice is evident.  
Although it may not be feasible to rely on binary categories to create 
a mechanism for determining deference, the rationales underlying those 
categories may continue to inform capacity and legitimacy in judicial 
means-testing in both section 1 and section 7.89 It is important to recog-
nize, however, that these common institutional capacity and legitimacy 
factors ought to weigh differently in a purposive, contextually-grounded 
application of the different sections.  
                                                                                                             
86 For a more complete discussion of this point, see Choudhry, supra, note 55.  
87 Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2000] S.C.J. No. 58, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 764 
(S.C.C.) (upholding limits on third party spending); R. v. Bryan, [2007] S.C.J. No. 12, [2007] 
1 S.C.R. 527 (S.C.C.) (upholding a law prohibiting dissemination of election results from one 
electoral district to another if polling stations in the other district are still open). See also Khawaja, 
supra, note 45, at para. 73 (avoiding the freedom of speech implications of the impugned legislation 
by interpreting the criminal prohibition on participation in terrorist activity as catching only violent 
acts or expression, which are excluded from the protective zone of freedom of expression). 
88 Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] S.C.J. No. 44, [1998] 
1 S.C.R. 877, at para. 90 (S.C.C.).  
89 This finds some support in Deschamps J.’s own pronouncements in Chaoulli, supra, note 
21, at para. 95, even though one might doubt whether Deschamps J. followed her own advice in that 
case:  
In short, a court must show deference where the evidence establishes that the gov-
ernment has assigned proper weight to each of the competing interests. Certain 
factors favour greater deference, such as the prospective nature of the decision, the 
impact on public finances, the multiplicity of competing interests, the difficulty of 
presenting scientific evidence and the limited time available to the state. This list is 
certainly not exhaustive.  
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Section 1 has been understood as a device for placing limits on 
rights, based on the recognition that courts lack the democratic authority 
provided by electoral accountability, and that they lack expertise and re-
sources to determine whether a particular law will increase the general 
welfare.90 In other words, section 1 is explicitly concerned with temper-
ing judicial overreach in light of the legislature’s presumed democratic 
legitimacy; its mandate is to protect the general welfare; and its superior 
resources for collection, analysis and integration of empirical data for 
policy formulation. These factors operate differently in different con-
texts. Thus, in the wake of Chaoulli (in which the Supreme Court of 
Canada struck down a measure designed to protect the public health care 
system in favour of an individual right to purchase private health insur-
ance), Sujit Choudhry defended the less exacting Oakes standard. In his 
view, a more flexible Oakes standard, requiring not proof, but “reasoned 
demonstration of the good which the law may achieve in relation to the 
seriousness of the infringement”,91 recognizes that governments need to 
be able to act in the public interest under conditions of uncertainty. Oakes 
should be understood as a way of allocating the risk of uncertainty,92 
bearing in mind such factors as relative institutional expertise, the bal-
ancing of interests, particularly those of the vulnerable, and the 
seriousness of the rights interests at stake.  
Section 7, on the other hand, is a substantive, individual right. If the 
guarantees against arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross disproportionality 
are to be understood as substantive principles of fundamental justice, 
their application must be guided by a conception of section 7’s substan-
tive purpose. Untethered from such a purpose, it is difficult to know 
which factors for deference ought to be favoured and why, and deference 
on factual determinations will appear to be capriciously allocated. The 
final section of this paper draws lessons from section 7’s history and 
makes some preliminary suggestions about how substantive normativity 
might guide judicial deference in the context of a section 7 right to pro-
portionate lawmaking.  
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V. BEYOND LIMITATIONS: A RIGHT TO PROPORTIONATE  
LAWMAKING? 
The rising prominence of proportionality as a principle of fundamen-
tal justice can be understood as a retreat to an appearance of value-
neutrality following the difficulty setting substantive boundaries on enti-
tlements such as liberty and limiting the principles of fundamental justice 
to those linked with institutions of justice.93 And yet, although propor-
tionality analysis appears to assess only how closely government action 
tracks its goals, substantive values may be inescapable as courts identify 
those goals and scrutinize proportionality with close attention to the pol-
icy’s real-world impacts, in all its complexity.94 If proportionality is to 
retain legitimacy among the principles of fundamental justice, courts 
may need to be more explicit about the values that guide its application. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully flesh out what those values 
might be or to place them within existing justifications for rights-based 
review.95 I do, however, suggest that the focus on proportionality reflects 
an underlying concern in section 7 with overweening or abusive majori-
tarianism. So understood, purposive proportionality analysis may permit 
courts to take into account the transparency and inclusiveness of law-
making beyond ordinary political processes among the factors guiding 
deference.  
The Supreme Court has not decisively set out the purpose of section 7 
the way it has for other rights.96 It has, however suggested methodologies 
for identifying the principles of fundamental justice, which certainly 
inform that purpose. The Motor Vehicle Reference stated that the principles 
of fundamental justice are exemplified by the guarantees in sections 8-14, 
and might also be expressed in common law rules.97 But as Hamish 
Stewart has observed, the “common thread among these principles was not 
their historical association with a particular legal system or international 
                                                                                                             
93 See Part II, supra.  
94 See Part III, supra.  
95 See Stewart, supra, note 20, at 308-13 (sketching and contextualizing a liberal-
democratic defence of a broad interpretation of s. 7, and suggesting that a broad s. 7 may have the 
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96 See, e.g., Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 157-60 
(S.C.C.) (setting out the purpose of s. 8 of the Charter as protecting a reasonable expectation of 
privacy); R. v. Sinclair, [2010] S.C.J. No. 35, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 310 (S.C.C.) (stating that the purpose 
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order but their connection with a normative idea about the function of 
law”.98 The Motor Vehicle Reference suggested that the principles of 
fundamental justice are founded upon the “dignity and worth of the 
human person” and the “rule of law”.99  
The ways in which the principles against arbitrariness and gross dis-
proportionality are driven by the rule of law or the dignity and worth of a 
human being have not been made explicit.100 In fact, ironically, the only 
time the Court has invoked the rule of law in relation to gross dispropor-
tionality has been to uphold the criminal prohibition on non-medical use 
of marijuana on the basis that it would undermine the rule of law for the 
Court to count the fact that people do not comply with the law against it 
in the analysis of gross disproportionality.101  
On the other hand, some keys to the link between the protection from 
arbitrary action on the one hand and rule of law and human dignity on 
the other may be found in the jurisprudence. In Heywood, for example, 
Cory J. stated that overbroad laws violate the principles of fundamental 
justice because they limit rights for no reason.102 The same can of course 
be said of arbitrary laws. Grossly disproportionate laws limit rights for 
insufficient reason. The proportionality norms can thus be understood to 
vindicate the dignity of human beings and arguably rule of law by pro-
tecting against overweening majoritarianism — majoritarianism that 
takes insufficient account of the needs of those whose interests may be 
excluded from or harmed by law and policy. 
If the norms against arbitrariness, overbreadth, and gross dispropor-
tionality are designed to protect against overweening majoritarianism, it 
follows that, in addition to the capacity- and legitimacy-affecting factors 
considered explicitly or implicitly within the Oakes framework, courts 
adjudicating section 7 claims may be less inclined to shift the risk of un-
certainty onto government where its laws and policies are made with 
demonstrated attention and input from those most affected, including 
those marginalized from legislative processes.103 Hogg states the same 
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proposition in the inverse in response to his own concerns about judicial 
overreaching in section 7 adjudication: “If persons harmed by the dys-
functional law have little popular appeal or political power, then 
legislators may be uninterested in their problems and disinclined to take 
any action especially if they believe that a remedial law is likely to be 
unpopular. In that situation, there is a case for judicial review of the dep-
rivation of life, liberty or security of the person of the unpopular 
minority.”104 In the context of challenges to the federal crime agenda, for 
example, the legitimacy of judicial intervention would not come from 
courts’ relative expertise in the appropriateness of, say, mandatory mini-
mum sentences (which may be a question of values over which the court 
has no greater institutional legitimacy), but from the facility with which 
the majoritarian legislatures might sacrifice the rights of the abstract ac-
cused, considering in particular the social and political marginalization of 
those who pass through the criminal justice system.  
There are methodological, doctrinal, and conceptual challenges to 
factoring marginalization from political processes into deference granted 
in proportionality analysis. How are politically powerless minorities to 
be identified? And when will efforts to include and consider such minori-
ties answer a charge of overweening majoritarianism? Such questions 
have troubled international human rights scholars interpreting similar 
requirements to include the participation of marginalized groups in health 
policy, for example.105 
Furthermore, courts have historically been reluctant to inquire into 
the “democratic quality” of laws passed through constitutionally man-
dated processes. In Wells v. Newfoundland, for example, the Court 
affirmed that legislative decision-making was not subject to any adminis-
trative law duty of fairness beyond the constitutional requirements for 
valid law-making.106 Similarly, in Authorson v. Canada, the Supreme 
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Court stated: “long-standing parliamentary tradition makes it clear that 
the only procedure due any citizen of Canada is that proposed legisla-
tion receive three readings in the Senate and House of Commons and 
that it receive Royal Assent. Once that process is completed, legislation 
within Parliament’s competence is unassailable.”107 On that basis, the 
Court upheld legislation to expropriate interest owed on pensions of dis-
abled veterans, even contrary to the Crown’s fiduciary duty, and rejected 
Authorson’s claim that he should have been given notice and a hearing to 
contest the expropriation law.  
One response to the doctrinal objection is that neither Wells nor 
Authorson concerned a constitutional rights claim. Wells was principally 
argued on administrative law grounds,108 and the claim in Authorson was 
based on the Bill of Rights protections against deprivation of property 
except by due process of law and to a fair hearing for determination of 
rights and obligations.109 And indeed, the Court in Authorson conceded 
that “legislatures are subject to constitutional requirements for valid law-
making, but within their constitutional boundaries, they can do as they 
see fit”.110  
It remains an open question, from a doctrinal perspective, whether 
courts might directly or indirectly favour more inclusive lawmaking 
practices or take into account political marginalization in enforcing 
constitutional rights. Although the Court has not read rights to participation 
beyond ordinary electoral processes into existing constitutional guarantees, it 
has suggested a willingness to encourage more inclusive policymaking 
through rights enforcement, even at the risk of blurring traditional lines 
around its function. In Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia, for example, the 
Court, by a 5-4 majority, approved of a novel constitutional remedy in which 
the judge retained jurisdiction to require the Nova Scotia government to 
report to the claimants, in Court, its progress in constructing schools in 
fulfilment of constitutional minority language education rights.111 A strong 
dissent objected that the court was overstepping its role of declaring the law 
and ordering relief and thus undermined the principle of separation of 
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powers.112 The case does stand, however, as an example of the softening of 
rigid conceptions of the separation of powers in service of the Court’s 
perception of effective rights enforcement.  
A focus on whether it is doctrinally feasible to factor political mar-
ginalization into the proportionality calculus begs the question of 
whether such a thing is normatively desirable. This paper does not pur-
port to offer an exhaustive answer to that question. Rather, it suggests 
that if the normative concern underlying proportionality analysis is with 
oppressive majoritarianism, then, in a complex world where it becomes 
difficult to demonstrate with certainty that a policy is doing what it pur-
ports to do, it may make sense to offer governments a greater margin of 
manoeuvre where they are making efforts toward more inclusiveness in 
setting law and policy.  
It notes briefly, however, that accounting for political marginalization 
in this way finds support within frameworks that see rights as corrections 
for democratic deficits in ordinary political processes. Traditionally, 
human and constitutional rights have been criticized for being anti-
democratic: they vest power in courts to second-guess democratic 
legislative choices. Two responses are typical: some concede the point 
that rights are anti-majoritarian, but accept that other values are more 
important.113 Deliberative democratic theorists, seeking to steer a middle 
ground between rights and democracy, and drawing on the idea that 
democracy and rights are interdependent,114 support the increasingly 
dominant idea that courts and legislatures both have a role to play in 
rights enforcement. Further, they have challenged the democratic 
legitimacy of ordinary political processes themselves, urging more robust 
processes seeking better input from citizenry.115 Giving government more 
leeway when it seeks to craft laws with input from and attention to 
groups traditionally marginalized from political processes is one way to 
encourage such collaboration.  
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Taking account of the political exclusion of marginalized groups and 
individuals in allocating the risk of uncertainty in proportionality analysis 
likewise finds support among those who argue that section 7 ought to be 
informed by a concern for substantive equality and addressing social and 
economic power imbalance.116 Indeed, this paper has suggested that 
proportionality analysis, detached from such a substantive purpose, runs 
the risk of arbitrariness. Section 1 is concerned with when governments, 
through the laws they pass, might justifiably place limits on rights. 
Section 7, on the other hand, has the potential to support a substantive 
conception of proportionality that responds to heavy-handed, opaque, 
perverse or ineffective policy that compromises life, liberty and security 
of the person. Given the complexities of measuring the real-world impact 
of law and policy, such a normative foundation may help temper, cabin, or 
at least expose some of the subjectivity inherent in a purportedly value-
neutral proportionality analysis.  
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